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I. Introduction and Summary 
 
On October 23, Senator Al Franken and FCC Commissioner Mignon Clyburn co-authored an op-
ed that criticized arbitration agreements in consumer telecommunications contracts.1 The article 
was part of a broader effort by Commissioner Clyburn to force the FCC to ban such agreements.2 
As Senator Franken and Commissioner Clyburn tell it, arbitration clauses originated with a 
“series of controversial Supreme Court decisions” that “effectively lock[] the courtroom door” 
on customers and allow companies to evade responsibility for misbehavior.3 While the agency 
declined her call to ban these clauses as part of its recent ISP privacy order, it has committed to 
opening a rulemaking on the topic in February 2017.4 
 
But while Commissioner Clyburn’s dedication to consumers is unquestioned, she is wrong about 
both the law of arbitration agreements and their likely effects on customers. Arbitration 
originates not in recent Supreme Court cases but in the Federal Arbitration Act, a 1925 statute 
that established a strong federal policy favoring the practice. For nearly a century, this act has 
prevented government officials from banning arbitration provisions without permission from 
Congress in the form of a clear statutory directive – permission that the FCC does not have. And 
for good reason: while arbitration proceedings differ from traditional court cases, numerous 
studies show that consumers fare better in arbitration, especially when one considers arbitral 
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rules and industry best practices that limit consumer exposure and provide incentives to pursue 
even small claims. Companies prefer arbitration not because they are more likely to win, but 
because they can resolve disputes more quickly and less expensively than through traditional 
litigation. And in the event that a claim proves difficult to arbitrate, Section 208 of the 
Communications Act assures that the Commission remains available as a backstop for consumer 
complaints. 
 
The 2016 election will prompt a change in FCC leadership, which means it is less likely now that 
the agency will follow through on its commitment to propose new rules about arbitration 
agreements. But because the issue remains hotly contested, it is worthwhile to flesh out in greater 
detail why Commissioner Clyburn’s proposed ban is both bad law and bad policy. 
 
II. The Commission Lacks Authority to Prohibit Consumer Arbitration Agreements 
 
As a threshold matter, the proposed ban runs afoul of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). The 
statute provides that any “written provision in any…contact evidencing a transaction involving 
commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or 
transaction…shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law 
or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”5 As the Supreme Court explained (in an opinion 
written by progressive luminary Justice William Brennan), the FAA “is a congressional 
declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any [] 
substantive or procedural policies to the contrary.”6 Congress passed the statute “in response to 
widespread judicial hostility to arbitration agreements.”7 Federal policy favoring arbitration 
affords the parties “discretion in designing arbitration processes [] to allow for efficient, 
streamlined procedures tailored to the type of dispute.”8  
 
The Supreme Court recently rejected a ban similar to that proposed by Commissioner Clyburn – 
in the explicit context of a telecommunications contract. In AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion 
(2011), customers brought a putative class action alleging they were improperly charged sales 
taxes on “free” phones under their wireless service contracts.9 AT&T moved to compel 
arbitration under the contract, which required arbitration of all disputes between the parties and 
prohibited classwide procedures.10 The trial court denied the motion, holding that the ban on 
class arbitration was unconscionable under California law, which governed the agreement.11 But 
the Supreme Court reversed, holding that California’s prohibition on collective-arbitration 
waivers was preempted by the FAA.12 The Court summarized its lengthy arbitration 
jurisprudence in no uncertain terms: “When state law prohibits outright the arbitration of a 
particular type of claim, the analysis is straightforward: The conflicting rule is displaced by the 
FAA.”13 
 
Although Concepcion focused on state laws prohibiting arbitration, the same principles apply to 
agency rules that would prohibit the practice. After all, the Administrative Procedure Act 
requires courts to “hold unlawful and set aside agency action…found to be…in excess of 
statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right” or “otherwise not in 
accordance with law.”14 Agency rules must accord not only with the agency’s own organic 
statute, but also “other Acts…where Congress has spoken…more specifically to the topic at  
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hand.”15 This means that to override the FAA’s strong endorsement of arbitration agreements 
generally, the Commission would need specific statutory authority to regulate such agreements 
in the telecommunications context. 
 
And this is where the FCC differs from other agencies that Senator Franken and Commissioner 
Clyburn cite to support their proposed ban. The op-ed notes that other agencies, such as the 
Department of Defense and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), have adopted or 
are considering bans on arbitration agreements by entities subject to their regulatory purview. 
With respect to the Defense Department, this prohibition arises not from agency regulation but 
from statute, specifically the Defense Appropriations Act of 2010, which bars large defense 
contractors from requiring employees to arbitrate civil rights or sexual harassment claims.16 The 
statute stemmed from Halliburton’s (unsuccessful) attempt to arbitrate claims arising from an 
employee who alleged she was raped by co-workers in Iraq. This harm is a far cry from a 
hypothetical “mysterious 99-cent fee…appearing on your broadband bill” about which Senator 
Franken and Commissioner Clyburn express concern – far enough for Congress to have created a 
statutory exception to the FAA to cover such claims. Similarly, the CFPB is considering rules 
limiting arbitration in consumer financial services agreements because the Dodd-Frank Act 
explicitly directed the Bureau to study and, if necessary, restrict such agreements in this specific 
context.17  
 
The FCC lacks a similar statutory mandate to consider the role of arbitration agreements in 
telecommunications contracts, and therefore is subject to the FAA’s general policy in favor of 
arbitration agreements. For any agency concerned with respecting the boundaries of its statutory 
authority – or with avoiding another embarrassing reversal in federal court – this legal reality 
should be the end of the matter. 
 
III. A Ban on Arbitration Agreements Would Be Bad Policy 
 
Aside from these legal obstacles, a ban on consumer arbitration agreements is also likely to be 
bad policy. Admittedly, Senator Franken and Commissioner Clyburn raise a concern that is 
reflected among many academics, namely, the potential that arbitration panels may be 
systemically biased in favor of corporations and against consumers. But, of course, these claims 
are empirical in nature and can be tested. After years of criticism based largely upon anecdotal 
evidence and supposition, scholars are beginning to study arbitration more thoroughly, finding 
results that are at odds with this perceived wisdom. Surveying these recent studies, Professor 
Peter Rutledge of the University of Georgia Law School concluded that “most of the 
methodologically sound empirical research does not validate the criticisms of arbitration.”18 For 
example, he explains that contrary to popular critique, in employment cases “arbitration 
generally results in higher win rates and higher awards for employees than litigation.”19 Rutledge 
states that “most measures – raw win rates, comparative win rates, comparative recoveries and 
comparative recoveries relative to amounts claimed – do not support the claim that consumers 
and employees achieve inferior results in arbitration compared to litigation.”20  
 
Professor Rutledge’s results are mirrored by a 2010 study by Northwestern Law School’s Searle 
Civil Justice Institute, which looked at the results of over 300 consumer arbitrations by the 
American Arbitration Association, one of the leading arbitral forums. The study found that 
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consumers won some relief 53% of the time, and 63% of successful consumers who requested 
attorney’s fees received them.21 The study also found no statistically significant difference 
between the success rate of repeat players and non-repeat players.22 Of course, both this study 
and Professor Rutledge’s article correctly note that more analysis is needed. But these studies 
provide no support for, and therefore call into question, the policy claims driving the call for an 
arbitral ban. 
 
Senator Franken and Commissioner Clyburn seem particularly troubled by clauses prohibiting 
class arbitration. In addition to the “mysterious 99-cent charge” hypothetical noted above, they 
imagine a scenario in which a customer pays for an upgrade to faster Internet service but the 
service keeps cutting out, and another one in which a customer seeking to terminate service is 
charged a $200 early termination fee that he or she does not remember agreeing to. They argue 
that, absent the ability to aggregate multiple smaller claims into a larger payday, no consumer-
friendly lawyer has an incentive to take the case, and any consumer who pursues such litigation 
will pay more in court costs than he or she can expect to recover. Therefore, they argue, the 
claimant effectively lacks a forum to seek relief. 
 
While on the surface these anecdotes seem compelling and help flesh out the general arguments 
in favor of class actions, a closer examination reveals three difficulties with this logic. First, as 
Commissioner Michael O’Rielly noted when dissenting from the Broadband Privacy Order, the 
“fact-specific nature of many of the disputes that end up in arbitration – such as an incorrect bill 
– do not lend themselves to class certification.”23 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), 
which governs class actions for damages, allows certification only if questions of law or fact 
common to class members predominate over any questions affecting individual members. In 
each of the three scenarios above, liability could turn upon individual facts unique to each 
claimant. For example, both the “mysterious 99-cent charge” and the early termination fee turn 
upon specific facts about what the claimant was told about the purpose of the charge and whether 
the claimant agreed – facts that differ from claimant to claimant and therefore make class 
certification inappropriate.24 Similarly, poor service quality could stem from environmental 
factors unique to each customer’s property, which makes class certification impossible. 
 
Second, while it may not be cost-efficient to litigate small claims in a traditional courtroom, it 
may nonetheless be worthwhile to arbitrate such claims. Many corporations, including 
telecommunications companies, adopt consumer-friendly arbitration practices that help make 
smaller claims viable. For example, the court in Concepcion noted that AT&T’s arbitration 
agreement included the following provisions: 
 
 Customers could file a complaint with a simple one-page web form; 
 AT&T must pay all costs for nonfrivolous claims; 
 The arbitration must occur in the county where the customer is billed; 
 For claims less than $10,000, the customer could proceed in person, by telephone, or on 
written submissions alone; 
 Either party could elect to proceed in small claims court rather than arbitration; 
 AT&T could not seek reimbursement for attorney’s fees; and 
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 If the customer received an arbitration award greater than AT&T’s last settlement offer, 
the company would pay a minimum $7500 recovery plus twice the claimant’s attorney’s 
fees.25 
 
The trial court found that the informal resolution process was likely to “prompt full or 
even…excess payment to the customer without the need to arbitrate.”26 More importantly, the 
$7500 premium provided a “substantial inducement for the customer to pursue the claim in 
arbitration” even if it was for a small amount. In fact, the trial court found that consumers who 
pursued individual arbitration were better off than participants in a class action, which “could 
take months, if not years, and which might yield an opportunity to submit a claim for recovery of 
a small percentage of a few dollars.”27 Nor is AT&T an outlier in this regard: in a recent FCC 
filing Verizon explained that its customers similarly receive their choice of in-person, telephonic, 
or written proceedings, that the company covers all arbitration fees, and that the customer is 
guaranteed $5000 plus attorney’s fees if he or she receives an award greater than the company’s 
final settlement offer.28 In the CFPB proceeding, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce highlighted 
similar provisions in arbitration agreements by many different companies, including Amazon, 
Dell, Microsoft, American Express, and Sprint.29 Where companies do not assume all costs 
voluntarily, national arbitration organizations typically cap consumer arbitration costs by rule, 
mandating the remaining costs be paid by the company.30 For example, under AAA rules the 
consumer pays a $200 filing fee but the company pays all other costs, including arbitrator 
compensation, expenses, hearing fees, and room rental fees.31 
 
Finally, even if Commissioner Clyburn were correct that individual arbitration was not cost-
effective, there remains a forum available for the consumer to file a complaint and seek redress: 
the Federal Communications Commission. Section 208 of the Communications Act allows 
consumers to file complaints directly with the agency for any violation of its common carriage 
duties.32 Those duties include the obligation to assure that “all charges, practices, classifications, 
and regulations for and in connection with such communications service, shall be just and 
reasonable”33 and that it avoid “unjust or unreasonable discrimination in charges, practices, 
classifications, regulations, facilities, or services.”34 And Section 209 authorizes the Commission 
to order telecommunications carriers to pay damage awards to consumers based on their filed 
complaints.35 Most companies acknowledge, as they must, that arbitration agreements do not 
displace a consumer’s right to bring issues before federal, state, or local authorities such as the 
FCC.36 So the idea that class waivers mean that corporations “evade accountability” for 
misconduct and become “impossible to stop,” as Senator Franken and Commissioner Clyburn 
claim,37 is simply false. The Commission itself remains a backstop for consumer complaints that 
somehow escape arbitration.  
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
In recent years the Commission has displayed an unfortunate tendency to pursue controversial 
policy objectives even in the face of serious questions about its authority to do so. For example, 
in its rush to support municipal broadband, the agency was willfully blind to Supreme Court 
precedent that clearly foreclosed it from preempting state laws governing municipal actions.  
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When challenged, the agency suffered an embarrassing and entirely foreseeable defeat in the 
Sixth Circuit.38 Commissioner Clyburn’s proposed arbitration ban suffers from a similarly 
glaring legal deficiency, and if enacted would likely suffer a similar fate in court. 
 
It would be doubly foolish for the agency to risk another such loss in pursuit of such a poor 
policy. The crusade against arbitration agreements is built upon a caricature of both the 
arbitration process and the companies that rely upon them. In reality, consumers fare well in 
arbitration proceedings, particularly when arbitral organizations and companies adopt procedures 
that minimize the burden of arbitration on consumers and provide adequate incentives to pursue 
even small claims. The concern about loss of class status is exaggerated, as many 
telecommunications issues are not suitable for class treatment and even if they were, individual 
arbitration has numerous structural advantages over traditional class litigation. 
 
Ultimately, the Commission itself remains an adjudicator of last resort for such claims, meaning 
that a consumer can always choose not to pursue arbitration, but instead to vest his or her 
concerns in the agency Congress designated as the country’s expert on telecommunications 
issues. An arbitration ban would be a boon to trial lawyers, but it’s difficult to see how foregoing 
the benefits of arbitration would be beneficial to American consumers.  
 
* Daniel A. Lyons, an Associate Professor of Law at Boston College Law School, is a Member 
of the Free State Foundation’s Board of Academic Advisors. The Free State Foundation is an 
independent, nonpartisan free market-oriented think tank located in Rockville, Maryland. 
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